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 TURKEY’S MILITARY VICTORY OVER THE PKK AND 
ITS FAILURE TO END THE PKK INSURGENCY 
 
This paper explores the major reasons why Turkey could not end the PKK insurgency despite 
its military defeat in the late 1990s. It argues that the Turkish governments failed to 
sufficiently address two key aspects of their low intensity conflict with the PKK, namely the 
fact that the PKK is not only a group of armed militants, but rather a complex insurgent 
organisation and that it appeals to a large number of Kurds. Turkey’s inability to quell 
definitively the PKK insurgency raises significant questions regarding the justification and 




Turkey has been struggling with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeren 
Kurdistan-PKK) insurgency since the 1980s. Throughout the 1990s, Turkish security forces 
conducted a determined counterinsurgency campaign against the PKK, as a result of which 
its leader Abdullah Öcalan acknowledged military defeat.1 Öcalan was captured and arrested 
in 1999, and the PKK subsequently declared a unilateral ceasefire. By the early 2000s, the 
PKK was militarily weak, and the majority of its members were outside of Turkey’s borders. 
However, after a few years of calm, on 1 June 2004, the PKK put an end to its unilateral 
ceasefire and once again, began to attack civilian and military targets in Turkey. How was the 
PKK able to survive and rebuild itself in such a short period of time? In the late 1990s and 
the early 2000s, Turkey’s fight against the PKK was identified as a success story in 
counterinsurgency.2 However, it soon became evident that Turkey’s military defeat of the 
PKK could not bring an end to the insurgency. The PKK recovered quickly and renewed its 
commitment to violence in 2004.3 Turkey’s inability to quell definitively the PKK insurgency 
raises significant questions regarding the justification and effectiveness of the use of military 
force in dealing with insurgencies. 
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The use of military force and its consequences in counterinsurgency has long been a 
subject of debate. From Britain’s struggle with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to Sri 
Lanka’s counterinsurgency campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
academic studies and real world experiences present a mixed record of success for the 
usefulness of military force in struggling with insurgencies. While some scholars and policy 
makers argue that the application of military force has a key place in counterinsurgency, 
others believe that counterinsurgency is mainly a political endeavour and military methods 
alone can never bring a complete end to an insurgency.  
This paper asks the question of why Turkey could not end the PKK insurgency 
despite its military defeat in the late 1990s. It argues that the political dimension of the PKK 
insurgency played a determinative role in the perpetuation of its existence. More specifically, 
the paper demonstrates that the Turkish governments failed to sufficiently address two key 
aspects of their low intensity conflict with the PKK, namely the fact that the PKK is not only 
a group of armed militants, but rather a complex insurgent organisation and that it appeals to 
a large number of Kurds. By the late 1990s, although Turkey’s counterinsurgency campaign 
weakened the PKK militarily, it left the organisation intact to a great extent with a complex 
institutional structure both in Turkey and abroad. Furthermore, throughout the 
counterinsurgency campaign, the Turkish governments failed to make a sufficient effort to 
win the hearts and minds of the Kurdish people. As a result, despite its military defeat, the 
PKK continued to sustain a significant support base, especially in southeastern Turkey. 
The rest of the paper discusses how Turkey’s shortcomings in its counterinsurgency 
policy prevented the complete end of the PKK violence and contributed to its revival from 
2004 onwards. The first section presents an historical overview of Turkey’s struggle with the 
PKK between 1984 and 1999. The following section starts with a discussion of the literature 
on counterinsurgency. Then it examines two major problems of Turkey’s counterinsurgency 
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policy in the 1980s and 1990s, namely the state authorities’ treatment of the PKK merely as a 
group of armed militants and their failure to win the hearts and minds of Turkey’s Kurdish 
citizens. The last section presents a summary and implications of the main arguments.  
 
 
The PKK was founded in 1978 as a Marxist/Leninist organisation. It initiated its 
armed struggle against Turkey in the early 1980s with the goal of creating an independent 
Kurdish state in predominantly Kurdish populated areas of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. The 
PKK’s first major attacks were on military targets in southeastern Turkey in 1984. At first, 
the Turkish political authorities did not take the PKK threat seriously and identified the group 
as a ‘bunch of bandits’. Thus, the initial response to the PKK came mainly from the military. 
This corresponded to a period of martial law in the region, which was imposed due to the 
increasing violence in the run up to the 1980 coup. By taking advantage of the martial law 
conditions, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) conducted several operations against the PKK 
both in the Southeast and across the Iraqi border in 1984 and 1985. The government also put 
into effect the village guard system in 1985 in an effort to receive the villagers’ assistance in 
the fight against the PKK.4  
In the early stages of the conflict, the TAF’s operations against the PKK were quite 
effective. The PKK was weak in the mid-1980s with around 200-300 armed militants. 
Furthermore, the PKK did not have much public support at the time. As a result, the 
organization incurred significant losses in its early confrontation with the Turkish security 
forces. In fact, after these initial clashes, the PKK convened its third Congress in 1986 in 
order to identify the causes of its failures and draw lessons from its mistakes.5 
The year 1987 marked a turning point in Turkey’s struggle with the PKK. In 1987, the 
Turgut Özal government replaced the martial law regime in the Southeast with a state of 
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emergency, comprising ten provinces in eastern and southeastern Turkey. The government 
also created the post of an emergency rule governor who would be responsible for assuring 
coordination among the governors of these provinces, as well as with their civilian and 
military officials. The removal of the martial law regime created a lot of opposition among 
the military officers because of the uncertain chain of command in the state of emergency. In 
this new system, the fight against the PKK was conducted mainly under the command of the 
police and gendarmerie forces. Thus, the TAF was not in direct control of the 
counterinsurgency campaign. This uncertainty created serious obstacles in Turkey’s struggle 
with the PKK and decreased its effectiveness. This transition also coincided with the PKK’s 
emergence as a more professional insurgent organisation from 1987 onwards. During this 
period, the PKK increased its recruitment activities among the Kurds and intensified its 
violent acts. As a result, sometimes out of fear and sometimes out of genuine support, the 
PKK increased its prominence among the local population and began to act more freely in the 
region.  
During the early 1990s, both military officers and civilian policy makers were 
seriously concerned about the PKK’s challenge to the Turkish state. Especially after the 1991 
Gulf War, the power vacuum in northern Iraq provided a comfortable living space for the 
PKK members, where they could carry out their armed and political activities.6 During this 
period, the number of fatalities caused by the PKK increased tremendously. While the PKK 
caused 1619 deaths between 1984 and 1990, this number rose to 4132 between 1991 and 
1993.7 In the early 1990s, the PKK was collecting taxes from the local population and 
providing them with an alternative law enforcement mechanism. There was almost a dual 
authority in some provinces of the Southeast. 
However, from 1993 onwards, Turkey carried out a determined counterinsurgency 
campaign against the PKK under the TAF’s full command, which led to a decrease in the 
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PKK violence from the mid-1990s onwards. According to the National Security Council of 
Turkey, by 1997 the PKK’s terrorist acts were reduced to a controllable degree.8 During this 
period, internal PKK correspondence also included comments about the beginning of a 
process of decline in the PKK.9 
In 1998, Turkey decided to take a final step to end the violent acts of an already 
weakened PKK. Öcalan had been living in Damascus since the 1980s, and Turkish civilian 
and military leaders thought that his expulsion from Syria would put the PKK in a vulnerable 
position. Thus, in October 1998 Turkey threatened the Syrian regime with military action if it 
did not expel Öcalan out of Damascus. In response, Syria deported Öcalan, a move that 
initiated the latter’s efforts to search for a new refuge and eventually gave way to his capture 
in Kenya in February 1999. After his capture, Öcalan was tried by the State Security Court in 
Turkey and sentenced to the death penalty. This sentence was commuted to life imprisonment 
after the removal of the death penalty from the Turkish Criminal Code in 2002. After 
Öcalan’s arrest in September 1999, at his request, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire and 
withdrew the majority of its armed militants outside of Turkey’s borders. Throughout his 
defence, Öcalan did not talk about an independent Kurdish state. Instead, he developed a 
discourse that emphasized his hope of Kurds and Turks living in a democratic Turkey. 
These developments seemed to mark the beginning of a process in which the PKK 
renounced violence. In the early 2000s, discussions mainly revolved around the implications 
of Turkey’s victory over the PKK and the PKK’s efforts to politicize the organisation. 
However, after his arrest, Öcalan never asked the PKK to disarm, and the PKK members 
continued their armed and political activities in northern Iraq. The subsequent developments 
demonstrated that it was too early to talk about a defeat on the PKK front. The peace turned 
out to be short-lived. On 1 June 2004, the PKK resumed its armed struggle against Turkey. 
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This situation showed that Turkey’s seemingly successful counterinsurgency policy had a 
number of serious limitations.  
 
 
Counterinsurgency is a multidimensional effort, which requires state action in a 
number of different domains. As Gordon McCormick aptly describes in his Diamond Model, 
attacking the insurgent infrastructure could be only one aspect of a state’s counterinsurgency 
strategy.10 Counterinsurgency is first and foremost a political endeavour.  
However, it is true that the state may need to fight the insurgents with the goal of 
containing their growth and their ability to continue. Actual fighting is, in fact, an 
indispensable element of counterinsurgency because when the state faces a violent group that 
targets its authority through terrorism and irregular warfare, its feels the need to counteract 
this challenge in order to restore control over its territory.  
All classical and modern thinkers on counterinsurgency, so far, have provided lengthy 
accounts on how the military aspect of counterinsurgency should be carried out. Among the 
existing studies, some scholars attribute a more central role to the use of coercion.11 These 
experts discuss different ways in which coercion works in counterinsurgency. Trinquier talks 
about how it is essential to make use of the police forces, and if necessary the army, in order 
to eliminate the enemy organisation among the population.12 He goes so far as to defend the 
use of torture during the interrogation of the prisoners.13 Galula promotes the idea that 
political and socio-economic measures are essential in counterinsurgency in order to win the 
support of the population. However, he also adds that in order for these measures to work, 
successful military and police operations must precede them to make sure the insurgents are 
no longer in control of the population.14 Among the more recent studies on 
counterinsurgency, Merom’s How Democracies Lose Small Wars (2003) and Luttwak’s 
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Counterinsurgency Warfare as Malpractice (2007) follow a similar approach. While Merom 
argues that states that are willing to use brutal methods can be successful in eliminating 
insurgencies, Luttwak asserts that in order to defeat an insurgency, the simple starting point is 
to realize that ‘insurgents are not the only ones who can intimidate or terrorize civilians’.15 
Thus, he recommends that states follow a similar strategy. 
In contrast to these works, many other scholars strongly emphasize the political nature 
of the insurgencies and argue that it is not possible to eliminate them mainly through the use 
of military force.16 These studies share the common view that in order to end the insurgent 
violence in a country, it is necessary to formulate an effective response to the political 
subversion as well as achieve military success against the insurgent forces. They all argue 
that the state must have a clear political goal from the very beginning of the 
counterinsurgency and that in addition to the coercive measures, it must adopt political, 
economic, and social programs in order to end the violence. As Arreguin-Toft states, pure 
barbarism may be effective only in the short term and only as a military strategy. ‘If the 
desired objective is long-term political control, barbarism invariably backfires.’17  
According to these scholars, there is an interplay of political and military dimensions 
in counterinsurgency. The political dimension especially involves the state’s efforts to win 
the support of the population in its struggle with the insurgents.18 This is the only way to 
establish the legitimacy of the state among the population and deplete the support the 
insurgents enjoy. Since the 1960s, scholars and practitioners of counterinsurgency have 
highlighted this goal of winning the loyalty and support of the population as the central pillar 
of a successful counterinsurgency campaign. As Mao Tse-tung stated, in On Guerrilla 
Warfare, the relationship between the population and the insurgents is similar to that of water 
and the fish that inhabit it. ‘[G]uerilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is 
supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies 
Turkey’s	  Military	  Victory	  over	  the	  PKK	  
	   8	  
and cooperation’.19 Thus, in a low intensity conflict, the state must strive for the support of 
the population and it must try to alienate the people from the insurgent organisation as much 
as possible.  
Throughout the low intensity conflict with the PKK between 1984 and 1999, most 
Turkish governments failed to see this political dimension of the PKK insurgency. They 
treated the PKK mainly as a group of armed militants and believed that an effective fight 
against these armed units would be enough to end the insurgency. 
Indeed, Turkey’s counterinsurgency campaign against the PKK was generally 
successful in targeting the PKK militarily. Especially from the mid-1990s onwards, Turkey’s 
strong military response to the PKK both in the Southeast and across the Iraqi border caused 
the insurgent organisation to incur serious losses. The cross-border operations significantly 
damaged the PKK’s infrastructure in northern Iraq, including its supply and ammunition 
warehouses and food stocks.20 This situation, when coupled with the imprisonment of the 
PKK leader Öcalan in 1999, crippled the insurgent organisation. 
However, this did not lead to the total disintegration of the PKK or a complete end to 
the insurgency. The PKK managed to survive and rebuild itself in a short period of time. 
After Öcalan was put into prison and the PKK withdrew its armed units outside of Turkey’s 
borders, major political and military actors in Turkey thought that the struggle with the PKK 
was over. However, although the PKK was militarily weak and unable to continue its armed 
struggle against the Turkish state in the late 1990s, it was intact as a political organisation 
promoting itself as a defender of Kurdish cultural and political rights. Throughout its 
counterinsurgency campaign, Turkey perceived the PKK mainly from a security perspective 
and it focused on fighting the PKK militants. However, in the late 1990s, despite its defeat in 
the face of the Turkish security forces, the PKK was still a strong organisation with an 
established system of networks and institutions. 
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The PKK was formulated as a political party in 1978 with a political, social, and 
military apparatus. However, as the insurgency strengthened and professionalized in the early 
1990s, the PKK attempted to create a parallel administrative structure in the southeastern part 
of Turkey through activities such as collecting taxes from the local population and providing 
alternative judicial services.21 During this period, both Turkish civilian and military actors 
were acknowledging that there was almost a dual authority in the Southeast. Especially at 
night, the PKK was in control of a number of small towns and villages.22  
By the early 2000s, the PKK turned into an even more complex organisation 
composed of several entities. These entities included armed units, sister parties in Syria23 and 
Iran,24 a ‘Kurdish Parliament in Exile’ in order to carry out the PKK’s diplomatic activities in 
Europe, special branches that organize women, and the popular front Kurdistan People’s 
Congress (Kongreya Gelê Kurdistanê-KONGRA-GEL).25 All of these elements were later 
brought together under the name of the Kurdistan Communities Union (Koma Civakên 
Kurdistan-KCK).26 The PKK developed an advanced organisational structure, which 
included both military units and those elements responsible for recruitment activities, 
ideological training, propaganda efforts in order to increase awareness about the Kurdish 
question, and fundraising.27 The organisation even developed its own news sources, 
publications and television stations.  
The PKK also built an advanced international network over the years. Throughout the 
low intensity conflict between 1984 and 1999, the PKK received tremendous support from a 
number of foreign countries as well as from Kurds living in different parts of the world, 
particularly in Europe. First of all, both Syria and northern Iraq served as a sanctuary for the 
PKK for a long time. Öcalan lived in Syria until he was expelled from Damascus in 1998, 
and the Syrian regime provided the PKK with weapons and training. Many Syrian Kurds also 
joined the PKK and fought against Turkey. Moreover, especially after the 1991 Gulf War, 
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northern Iraq turned into a major living space and military base for the PKK. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, the PKK received various forms of support from many other countries, including 
the Soviet Union, Iran, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Armenia, Libya, and Cuba.28 
Europe also has served as a major logistical and financial support base for the PKK. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, several European countries felt sympathetic to the PKK cause and 
they preferred not to confront the PKK activities within their borders. In fact, the EU did not 
label the PKK as a terrorist organisation until 2002.29 As a result, the PKK managed to act 
freely in many European countries. PKK members got mobilized in various Kurdish cultural 
associations and other non-governmental organisations in Europe.30 These organizations 
played a major role in Kurdish identity formation and mobilisation through activities such as 
celebrating Kurdish national holidays, teaching the Kurdish language and organising cultural 
gatherings.31 Funds provided by the Kurdish diaspora in Europe became a significant source 
of income for the PKK.32 The PKK raised funds in Europe through donations, subscriptions, 
support campaigns, publications and other legitimate business activities.33 The PKK also 
engaged in criminal activities to raise money, including drug trafficking, arms and human 
smuggling, robbery, extortion, and money laundering.34 
Considering the fact that the PKK has developed such a complex system of networks 
and institutions, as well as various sources of funding both at the domestic and international 
levels, it was no surprise that Turkey’s ability in weakening the PKK militarily in the late 
1990s did not bring an end to the PKK insurgency. The PKK came out of its fight against the 
Turkish security forces militarily weak, but far from destroyed. The PKK’s decision to 
withdraw the majority of its armed militants from Turkey turned out to be an opportunity for 
the organisation to regroup, consolidate, and restructure itself, rather than the starting point of 
a process of disarmament. After Öcalan’s imprisonment, the PKK maintained a low-key 
presence in northern Iraq, avoided violence, and mainly focused on rebuilding and 
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strengthening its organisational structure. It mainly carried out activities that would 
contribute to spreading awareness about the Kurdish question such as civil campaigns for the 
right of education in the mother tongue and for the recognition of Öcalan as the 
representative of the Kurds.35 During this period, Öcalan continued to lead the PKK from 
prison. Öcalan’s regular meetings with his lawyers and family members provided him with 
the opportunity to maintain his control over the PKK. Through these meetings, Öcalan 
conveyed his ideas and messages to the PKK’s presidential council, which was in charge of 
the organisation in Öcalan’s absence.36  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, pro-Kurdish political parties in Turkey also helped 
keep the PKK as a relevant organisation in Kurdish politics.37 Through its elected 
representatives both in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet 
Meclisi-TBMM) and at the municipal level, first the Democratic People’s Party (Demokratik 
Halk Partisi-DEHAP) and then the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi-
DTP) after the former’s closure by the Constitutional Court, pursued a determined political 
struggle for the Kurdish political and cultural rights in the country.  
In sum, from the very beginning, the PKK was designed as more than a group of 
armed people and it evolved into a complex organisation over the years. This process 
accelerated even more after Öcalan’s arrest in 1999. As a result, Turkey’s achievement in 
weakening the PKK militarily in the late 1990s did not mean much in the presence of an 
insurgent organisation with an advanced system of networks and institutions both in Turkey 
and abroad. Even after its military defeat, the PKK continued its propaganda, recruitment, 
and fundraising activities. It continued to play a significant role in Kurdish identity formation 
and mobilisation, and when it felt that the time was ripe, the PKK once again began to attack 
civilian and military targets in Turkey.  
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In the late 1990s, another major reason behind Turkey’s failure to end the PKK 
insurgency despite its military victory over the organisation was the continuing public 
support for the PKK among the Kurds. Winning the loyalty and support of the people is a key 
element of low intensity conflicts. However, Turkey failed to win over the support of many 
of its Kurdish citizens in the struggle with the PKK. Turkey’s counterinsurgency campaign 
was marked mainly by coercive means, and the consistent use of this approach ended up 
alienating the local Kurdish population. As a result, although the Turkish security forces 
defeated the PKK militarily in the late 1990s, the organisation’s support base remained intact. 
Recruitments as well as logistical and financial support for the PKK continued even in the 
aftermath of Öcalan’s arrest. This enabled the PKK to rebuild its strength in a short period of 
time and restore its attacks against the Turkish state from the mid-2000s onwards. 
Throughout the low intensity conflict between 1984 and 1999, many Kurds in the 
Southeast lost their loved ones, were forced to leave their villages, and experienced human 
rights violations. A new generation of Kurds grew up in the state of emergency conditions 
and became highly politicized and even radicalized.38 In the early 1990s, there were reports 
coming from the Southeast about people who disappeared under detention and never came 
back. Moreover, there were several news about increasing torture and ill-treatment towards 
the local people and burning down of forcibly evacuated villages.39 These kinds of 
experiences and especially the security forces’ involvement in human rights violations 
contributed to an increase in popular support for the PKK.40 Öcalan even stated in the early 
1990s that ‘if Jezireh [Cizre] is ours today, it is half thanks to our efforts. But the other half, 
Turkey presented to us on a silver platter’.41 A Parliamentary Commission, formed to 
investigate the unsolved murders of the early 1990s, explicitly reported that the security 
forces’ operations in the Southeast, which sometimes involved extrajudicial activities, 
increased public distrust towards state authorities and contributed to the growth of the PKK.42  
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Despite being aware of the worsening image of the state in the Southeast, the Turkish 
governments and the security forces failed to win the loyalty and support of the local Kurdish 
population. As a matter of fact, the state actors did develop a number of policies to gain the 
trust of the Kurdish citizens in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, the Turkish governments 
made a significant level of investment in the Southeast, mainly through the Southeast 
Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi-GAP), which included plans for a number of 
hydroelectric plants and irrigation systems on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. The policy 
makers expected that as the state provided the essential services and increased the living 
standards in the southeast region, the Kurdish people’s incentives to join the PKK would 
decrease. However, relentless discussions about the actual connection between prosperity and 
terrorism prevented these kinds of socio-economic policies from becoming a major 
component of Turkey’s counterinsurgency strategy. During these years, in addition to those 
who supported the pursuit of socio-economic policies in dealing with the PKK, there were 
also several political actors in Turkey who argued that economic prosperity would lead to the 
accumulation of more money in the hands of the PKK.43 
Turkey also attempted to address the political dimension of the PKK insurgency 
under the leadership of Turgut Özal (Prime Minister, 1983-1989, and President, 1989-1993, 
of Turkey). During his tenure, Özal took a number of important steps such as removing the 
ban on the public use of the Kurdish language, improving relations with the Iraqi Kurdish 
leaders and initiating secret indirect talks with the PKK leader Öcalan. However, these 
initiatives stopped all of a sudden when Özal died of a heart attack in 1993. In 1996, although 
Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan tried to follow a similar path by establishing indirect 
contacts with Öcalan in order to reach a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question, he could 
not gather enough support from the other major political actors in the country.  
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In the later years of the counterinsurgency campaign, the Turkish security forces 
embarked on a public relations campaign in the Southeast where they became more careful 
about avoiding harm to the civilians, played an important role in establishing schools and 
medical facilities, and tried to solve the local problems in cooperation with the civilian 
authorities.44 However, winning the loyalty and support of the Kurds never became the 
primary concern of the Turkish civilian and military authorities throughout the 
counterinsurgency campaign. Nor were these policies developed as part of an overall political 
objective regarding the resolution of the Kurdish question. Instead, Turkey mainly developed 
a security perspective towards the PKK and tried to end the insurgency by fighting the PKK 
militants both in Turkey and across the Iraqi border.  
In fact, after Öcalan’s arrest in 1999, Turkey acquired a tremendous opportunity to 
put an end to the PKK insurgency by looking at the conflict from a non-military perspective 
and developing the necessary policies that would help win the trust of the Kurdish 
population. During this period, the PKK had been militarily defeated and at Öcalan’s request, 
it had declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrawn most of its armed units outside of 
Turkey’s borders. Now that the PKK was far from posing a military threat to Turkey, the 
time was ripe for the Turkish policy makers to address the political, social, and economic 
dimensions of the PKK insurgency and to take the essential steps for the resolution of the 
Kurdish question. However, the coalition government in office between 1999 and 2002, 
which was composed of the center left Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP), 
ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP), and the center 
right Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP), once again failed to focus on formulating 
policies that would win the support of the Kurdish people. The coalition partners all thought 
that the PKK was ‘defeated and dissolving’,45 and thus what to do with the PKK in the post-
terror phase was not their main policy concern. In fact, even if the members of this coalition 
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government had wanted to take the necessary steps to deal with the Kurdish question after the 
PKK’s military defeat, they probably would not have achieved much because these political 
parties had very different ideological and programmatic approaches to the Kurdish 
question.46 Thus, it was very difficult for them to unite behind policies to deal with such a 
politically sensitive issue. Moreover, these political parties had to deal with two major 
earthquakes in 1999 and a serious financial crisis in 2001. Therefore, the government’s focus 
shifted towards these urgent matters and away from the PKK terrorism, which was in a state 
of relative calm after 1999.  
As a result, from the late 1980s onwards, it was possible to see the growing public 
support for the PKK in a variety of different occasions in the region. These included local 
demonstrations where the security forces ended up directly clashing with the people and 
Nevruz celebrations, which turned into violent mass protests of the PKK sympathisers where 
tens of people were killed and many more were arrested.47  In various occasions, thousands of 
people gathered in the Southeast waving PKK flags, holding the portraits of Öcalan and 
shouting ‘Long live our leader Apo’.48 In 1989, although the PKK formulated a ‘Compulsory 
Military Service Law’ in order to pressure the Kurds to join the insurgency, from 1991 
onwards, it had to stop the recruitment of new members temporarily because of the 
organisation’s inability to provide proper training for the large numbers of incoming 
militants.49 
The growing appeal of the pro-Kurdish political parties in the region was another 
indicator of increasing popular support for the PKK. While the first pro-Kurdish political 
party, People’s Labor Party (Halkın Emek Partisi-HEP) received 4.1 per cent of the votes in 
the 1991 national elections, its successor People’s Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi 
Partisi-HADEP) received 4.2 per cent in the 1995 elections and then 4.8 per cent of the votes 
in the 1999 elections. In the 2002 national elections, DEHAP received 6.2 per cent of the 
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votes.50 Although these numbers seem quite low for a nationwide election, the pro-Kurdish 
political parties actually won the majority of the votes in several southeastern provinces. The 
municipal elections brought similar results. HEP boycotted the 1994 municipal elections with 
the argument that the state’s policies made it very difficult for this political party to carry out 
a free campaign.51 However, in 1999, HADEP won 37 municipalities in the local elections. 
Among these 37 provinces, in three of them located at the most southeastern end of Turkey, 
namely Diyarbakır, Batman and Hakkari, HADEP received 62.5 per cent, 57.2 per cent, and 
56.1 per cent of the votes, respectively.52  
This outlook did not change much in the aftermath of Öcalan’s arrest. During this 
period, recruitments to the PKK continued unabated. In fact, according to an analysis based 
on the PKK’s recruitment cohorts killed between 2003 and 2008, a great majority of the 
militants joined the organisation between 1999 and 2003.53 When Öcalan was arrested on 15 
February 1999, the PKK sympathisers organized protests in a number of European countries. 
Some of the radical PKK supporters even occupied Greek diplomatic missions because 
Öcalan was captured when he was leaving the Greek embassy in Nairobi, Kenya on that 
day.54 This support and active recruitment of new members helped the PKK remain as a 
major actor of the Kurdish movement and maintain its capacity to fight after 1999.  
All in all, the PKK’s ability to create and maintain a significant level of public 
support among the Kurds and the Turkish governments’ inability to win the loyalty and 
support of its Kurdish citizens throughout the counterinsurgency campaign turned out to be 
another major factor that gave way to the PKK’s quick recovery after the organisation’s 
defeat and Öcalan’s arrest in the late 1990s. Despite the PKK’s weakened military status 
during this period, the organisation continued to be perceived as a defender of the Kurdish 
rights in the region. While Kurds continued to fill up the PKK ranks, many PKK 
sympathisers showed their support for the organization through their votes for the pro-
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Kurdish political parties that they saw as the legal representative of the PKK.55 The 
persistence of the PKK’s support base significantly contributed to the organisation’s ability to 
keep its relevance and popularity alive in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As a result, the PKK 
managed to restore its strength and renew its commitment to violence against Turkey from 
2004 onwards when it thought that the domestic and regional circumstances were in its favor. 
 
 
Turkey has been struggling with the PKK insurgency for more than 30 years. Despite 
Turkey’s ability in weakening the PKK militarily in the late 1990s, this did not bring an end 
to the PKK insurgency. It is possible to point out two major reasons why this was the case. 
First, although the PKK was never only a group of armed men, but rather a well-developed 
insurgency movement from the very beginning, the Turkish governments failed to perceive 
the real nature of the PKK insurgency and thought that the application of military force 
would be sufficient to incapacitate the movement. This failure may have resulted from a 
number of different factors, such as the Turkish policy makers’ mistake of equating the first 
PKK acts with the Kurdish rebellions of the early Republican years or the political influence 
of the Turkish military in the national security policy making process. Regardless of the main 
cause of this misperception, throughout the 1980s and 1990s the country’s counterinsurgency 
policy mainly revolved around fighting the PKK militants both in Turkey and across the Iraqi 
border. In the end, Turkey’s counterinsurgency campaign was effective in weakening the 
PKK militarily. However, it left the organisation intact to a great extent.  
Second, throughout the struggle with the PKK between 1984 and 1999, Turkey failed 
to win the loyalty and support of its Kurdish citizens. Although the Turkish governments and 
security forces developed a number of policies in order to alleviate the grievances of the 
Kurds, these policies never became a key concern of Turkey’s counterinsurgency strategy. As 
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a result, despite the PKK’s military defeat in the late 1990s, the PKK’s support base among 
the Kurds remained almost untouched. This opened way for uninterrupted recruitments for 
the PKK and increasing votes for the pro-Kurdish political parties in Turkey even after the 
imprisonment of Öcalan.  
All in all, Turkey’s military defeat of the PKK by the late 1990s did not have a long-
lasting impact on the fate of the insurgency because first, the PKK’s institutional structure as 
well as its domestic and international networks remained almost untouched after 1999, and 
second, the PKK’s public support among the Kurds continued. This situation allowed the 
PKK to recover in a short period of time and begin to attack civilian and military targets in 
Turkey when it thought that the domestic and regional circumstances were once again right. 
In this process, especially the regional developments worked to the advantage of the PKK. 
The United States’ war in Iraq brought the Kurds to the forefront of international politics as 
one of the most important American allies in the war. 
Turkey’s story appears to be on the side of those studies, which emphasize the key 
place politics occupies in counterinsurgency. Although a number of works in the literature 
highlight the role of military force and coercion in dealing with insurgencies, such as David 
Galula (1964) or more recently Merom (2003) and Luttwak (2007), the majority of the 
studies reiterate the idea that counterinsurgency has to have a clear political goal and it is 
mainly a political endeavour. Turkey’s experience provides further support for the latter 
approach.  
Today it is still possible to observe the emphasis on the use of military force and 
coercion in counterinsurgency. Discussions about Sri Lanka’s defeat of the Tamil Tigers and 
the outcomes of Russia’s wars against the Chechens constitute important representatives of 
this understanding. However, the Turkish experience demonstrates that although the use of 
military force works in counterinsurgency, it may not have a long-lasting impact. As long as 
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the non-military elements of the insurgency continue their activities and as long as the 
insurgents have popular backing, it is hard to talk about the ultimate end of an insurgency 
movement. The insurgency may seem to disappear now, but it may comeback in new shapes 
and forms in the future. 
The current state of Turkish politics presents a mixed record about the extent to which 
Turkey has drawn lessons from its past mistakes. On one hand, there are reasons to be 
optimistic. In recent years, there is an increasing number of academics, bureaucrats, and 
policy makers who emphasize the idea that the use of military force alone cannot constitute 
an effective struggle against the PKK. Even several high-ranking military officers now accept 
that nonviolent methods should be considered in the struggle with the PKK.56 In 2005, the 
incumbent Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) leader Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan acknowledged, for the first time, that the state made mistakes in its handling 
of the Kurdish question. Moreover, in 2009 the AKP government initiated the policy of the 
Kurdish opening, which aimed at ending the PKK violence and resolving the Kurdish 
question through peaceful means. Although this process created a nationalist backlash in its 
early stages, the AKP embarked on a new peace and resolution process in 2013, which 
envisaged building a process of dialogue with the jailed PKK leader Öcalan, the PKK’s 
declaration of a cease-fire, and the government’s implementation of a number of reforms that 
would improve the quality of democracy and extend the fundamental rights and freedoms in 
the country.  
Nevertheless, there are also reasons to be pessimistic. As of now, the future of the 
ongoing peace process in Turkey is uncertain. While the AKP government has been accusing 
the PKK of not properly carrying out its promise of a complete withdrawal from the Turkish 
soil, the PKK has been accusing the government of not implementing the reforms that would 
further democratize Turkey. Moreover, the civil war in Syria further complicated Turkey’s 
Turkey’s	  Military	  Victory	  over	  the	  PKK	  
	   20	  
Kurdish question. The emergence of Saleh Muslim’s Democratic Union Party (PYD) as a key 
actor in the Syrian civil war and its control over several towns in the Turkish Syrian border 
created important repercussions for Turkish policy makers. The PYD’s control over a 
significant portion of northern Syria created fears in the minds of  the Turks that a new 
Kurdish autonomous region, similar to that of northern Iraq, has been emerging. Turkish 
policy makers are concerned that this newly emerging autonomus Kurdish region may 
encourage parallel demands in the predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey.  
Another reason for pessimism is that despite the progress achieved since the 1980s, 
Turkish governments still fail to take some key steps to win the loyalty and support of the 
Kurdish citizens. The failure of the state institutions to uncover the Uludere incident, where 
34 young Kurdish smugglers were accidentally killed by air strikes of the Turkish armed 
forces along the Turkish-Iraqi border and the ongoing KCK trials, where several pro-Kurdish 
activists, academics, and politicians have experienced long detention terms, show that 
Kurdish grievances have not been fully addressed, yet. The results of the recent municipal 
elections on March 30, 2014 also revealed that the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party 
(Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi-BDP) won a significant percentage of the votes in many cities 
and towns of the Southeast, where the population is predominantly Kurdish. While the BDP 
won 4.6 per cent of the votes cast nationally, it was quite successful in the Southeast having 
acquired control of 80 municipalities. Throughout the election campaign, the BDP expressed 
its determination to work towards building democratic autonomy in local administrations. In 
the post-election period, the BDP’s newly elected Diyarbakır mayor Gültan Kışanak raised 
new questions about the concept of democratic autonomy with her suggestion that the 
Diyarbakır municipality should receive a share from the region’s oil revenues. 
The latest debates and developments in Turkey surrounding the Kurdish question 
show that Turkey is still far from reaching a public consensus about how to resolve the 
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Kurdish question through peaceful means. The regional developments involving Syria also 
make the Kurdish question more complex. However, the increasing recognition in Turkey 
that it takes more than the use of military force and coercion to deal with the PKK effectively 
is a significant progress in the history of Turkey’s Kurdish question.  
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